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Abstract 
 
 
Studies that focus on “twin” crises are still very rare, although after Asian crisis it has 
significantly increased interest of profession to develop this topic into a complex 
research field. Banking crises aid in predicting currency crises, but currency crises do 
not precede banking crises. Analysis of the behavior of various macroeconomic and 
financial variables in the periods before and after banking and currency crises has led 
to the development of new methods for creating early warning systems for crises. The 
key part of this work is an empirical test of the effectiveness of Kaminsky-Lizondo-
Reinhart signal method in predicting the two-fold crisis in Croatia. The ultimate goal 
of this exercise is to build an effective early warning system for banking and currency 
crises in Croatia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The balance of payments crises that have shaken the world in the last two 
decades have awakened interest in academic and political circles in creating systems 
for discovering the causes of the disturbances that end in currency crisis. If 
disturbances on foreign exchange markets could be identified early enough, there 
might be enough time for policymakers to take measures to avoid or at least diminish 
the severity of such crises. With this in mind, the present work attempts to develop 
such a system of early warning for currency crises in Croatia. 
 
However, the number of theoretical and empirical works on the potential links 
between banking and balance-of-payments crises is growing continuously. Research 
on these problems in a large number of countries has shown that banking problems 
help in the prediction of balance-of-payments crises. Many of the countries that have 
faced currency crisis have to a greater or lesser extent also faced banking crisis (recent 
examples include Finland, Mexico, Norway and Sweden). The International Monetary 
Fund estimates that banking crisis are more “expensive” than currency crisis, pointing 
out that the typical currency crisis induces a fall in domestic output of 4% to 7%, 
while twin (banking and currency) crises induce falls of up to 15% (IMF 1998). The 
macroeconomic situation in Croatia in 1998 and in early 1999 provides sample room 
to test this argument. 
 
A thorough examination of the literature on twin crises would be an extremely 
demanding theoretical and empirical task. Therefore, I will limit myself to see which 
of the signaling indicators for twin crises suggested in the literature would have the 
most value in Croatian conditions. However, the “signals” approach can only be 
developed if the economy has experienced either currency or banking crisis in the past 
that can be used to make an ex-post analysis of the behavior of key variables. 
 
I begin this article with a short overview of theoretical and empirical analyses 
of currency and banking crisis. I will only mention works that dealt with individual 
crises, and place greater emphasis on more recent cross-country studies that examine 
the connection between banking and currency crisis in an attempt to find common 
causes. The macroeconomic consequences of these crises are my main concern, as 
well as the possibility that earlier deterioration in key economic conditions provides a 
signal of upcoming crisis. After that, I will examine the Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart 
methodology of the “signals” approach more closely, as well as the results of the 
analysis of twin crises in various countries. Special attention will be paid to the 
attempt to apply this method to a sample of transition countries. All of this will 
provide an introduction to the final section, which examines the feasibility of using 
the “signals” approach in the case of Croatia. 
 
 
2.  Links between currency and banking crisis—theory and practice 
 
The theoretical examination of balance-of-payments crisis or currency crisis 
began with Paul Krugman’s (1979) article. However, the literature only really began 
to blossom in the middle of the 1980’s. In previous studies based on the traditional 
approach, the cause of currency crises was considered to be weak fundamentals. 
These weaknesses, further aggravated by expansive fiscal and monetary policies, 
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resulted in continuous declines in international reserves and the collapse of the 
exchange rate regime.
1
 Although the Krugman model has been amended and 
reformulated repeatedly over time, models using this approach usually emphasize the 
following potential indicators of currency crisis: movements in the real exchange rate, 
merchandise trade balance or current account, real wages and interest rates. 
 
Recent models abandon explanations that give international reserves the key 
role in undermining fixed exchange rates systems. Instead, they suggest that exchange 
rate fluctuations are the result of economic authorities’ concerns over the behavior of 
other key economic variables.
2
 The latest models extend the group of indicators of 
currency crisis to variables that can undermine the objective function of the economic 
authorities. Most often these variables are domestic and foreign interest rates, the 
level of public debt, government bond prices along with those of other debt securities 
held by the banking system, central bank lending to commercial banks, deposits, 
various political variables and “contagion” effects.  
 
The best known of the newer models is the “self-fulfilling” model of currency 
crisis. This model shifts the emphasis from economic fundamentals to the 
expectations held by economic agents (Obstfeld 1986). The self-fulfilling model 
suggests that speculative attacks on the currency and changes in equilibrium occur 
because of changes in actors’ expectations, even when fundamental macroeconomic 
variables are not perturbed. 
 
The literature on currency and banking crisis consists mainly of three groups 
of studies. One group consists of studies that seek the causes of banking panics and 
the causes of banking crises.
3
 A second group consists of studies that explain the 
causes of currency crises. Although this group of studies has a richer theoretical basis 
to draw on than the first, the same cannot be said for their empirical content.
4
 The 
third group of studies examines possible links between banking and currency crises, 
calling these “twin” crises. Although at times it is difficult to make a sharp distinction 
between these groups of studies,
5
 without a doubt only in recent times have serious 
efforts been made to examine the connections between currency and banking crises. 
These efforts have been sharply intensified since the Asian crisis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Thus the well-known Krugman model (1979) suggests that, under a fixed exchange rate, currency 
crises are preceded by periods of gradual but prolonged decreases in international reserves and credit 
expansion that exceeds the demand for money or fiscal imbalances along with increases lending to the 
public sector. In these conditions, continuous decreases in foreign exchange reserves stimulate 
speculative attacks on the domestic currency, which further exhausts reserves and forces the economic 
authorities to devalue. 
2
 See Ozkan and Sutherland (1995); Velasco (1987); Obstfield (1986, 1994, 1996) and Gerlach and 
Smets (1994). 
3
 An overview of this literature is found in Calomiris and Gorton (1991),  Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996), Frydl (1999). 
4
 See: Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992) who research traditional models; Obstfeld (1994, 1996) 
which gives a literature survey on self-fulfilling currency crises; Calvo (1995) which discusses various 
models of balance-of-payments crisis; and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) which studies 
successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks on the currencies of developed industrialized countries. 
5
 For example, Krugman (1979) quite clearly takes both types of crisis into account, although he does 
not look for common causes nor for the direction of causality. 
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2.1. “Twin” crises: basic concepts and macroeconomic effects 
 
As has already been mentioned, studies examining both types of crisis and their 
possible connections are still very rare, although greater interest has been shown in 
making them the subject of all-sided inquiry.
6
 The understanding that financial 
liberalization precedes many banking crises has been spreading, as has the 
understanding that banking crises often precede balance-of-payments problems and 
help in forecasting currency crisis. At the same time, there is inadequate evidence of 
the opposite link, from currency crises to banking crises. The pioneering work that 
brought the concept of twin crisis into the literature was that of Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996). Examining countries that experienced currency and banking crises in 
the years 1970-1995, Kaminsky and Reinhart construct an index of banking and 
balance-of-payments crises based on an analysis of movements in exchange rates and 
international reserves, as well as a chronological account of events. The authors 
believe that this “classification” of crises allows us to draw conclusions about possible 
causal relations between currency and banking crises. They are most interested in the 
behavior of various domestic and international macroeconomic variables in the 
periods before and after crises, and in whether it is possible to find common 
macroeconomic causes for these crises. Their main conclusions can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(1) There is no evidence of strong connections between currency and banking crises 
in the 1970’s, when financial markets were highly regulated. The weakening of 
capital regulations in the early 1980’s strengthened this connection, however. The 
majority of banking crises occurs in the 1980’s and 1990’s, after financial 
liberalization, in developing countries, but also in developed countries. 
(2) Most often banking crises precede currency crises, and reach their peak during the 
currency crisis (if it occurs at all).
7
 
(3) The roots of the crises are various domestic and foreign shocks. Very often 
recessions precede banking and currency crisis, manifesting themselves in general 
economic weakness, decreases in economic activity and exports, worsened terms 
of trade, growing real interest rates and contracting securities markets. Balance-of-
payments crises are preceded by decreases in foreign exchange reserves, rapid 
monetary growth, and growth in banking assets uncovered by increased foreign 
exchange reserves. Rapid credit expansion and growth in the money multiplier 
precede banking crises. 
 
Studies attempting to find leading indicators of twin crisis vary in coverage. 
Often they differ in the time period considered; some of them include as much as the 
last thirty years, while other only look at events in a single year. Some studies 
consider large samples including many countries, while some concentrate on only one 
country. More papers examine developing countries than developed countries. 
However, all studies have to face the difficult problem of defining a crisis. Crises may 
                                                 
6
 Theoretical studies of the connection between banking and currency crises can be found in: Diaz-
Alejandro (1985), Velasco (1987), Calvo (1995), Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996) and Chang and Velasco (1998). 
7
 The authors show that in the case of twin crises, most frequently banking crises occur first, followed 
by balance-of-payments problems. This becomes obvious in the end of the 1980’s and during the 
1990’s. 
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include certain events, for example, devaluation, but there are cases where such 
events are not required for a crisis. 
 
 
Defining currency crises  
 
Balance of payments crises most frequently are linked to devaluation or 
changes in the exchange rate regime, although up to now, no measure has been 
created to measure the size of the devaluation that is so crucial to defining crises. 
More recently, a more acceptable solution has been found in defining currency crises 
through monitoring the movements of exchange rates and international reserves 
(Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995). In this view, not every attack on the domestic 
currency results in changes in the exchange rate regime. If a speculative attack 
succeeds, the currency will indeed devalue. However, when the attack is less 
successful, the central bank will have room to intervene on the foreign exchange 
market. This, along with restrictive monetary policy will result in gradual increases in 
real interest rates or, perhaps, greater decreases in international reserves. 
 
Because of this, the construction of an index
8
 of currency crises that can 
“catch” all the manifestations of an attack on the currency is proposed. Such an index 
is a weighted average of the monthly growth rates of the exchange rate and 
international reserves. The index is usually interpreted in a straightforward manner: a 
crisis period is a period in which the value of the crisis index is two (or three) 
standard deviations above or below its mean value. Otherwise, the period is 
considered normal. This measure expresses at the same time the degree of loss of 
reserves and the degree of volatility of the exchange rate, and thus allows crises to be 
ranked by degree. 
 
 
Defining banking crises 
 
Although changes in banking deposits can be used as a sign of banking crisis, 
the fact is that problems are more frequently on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996). The beginning of a banking crisis most frequently is 
denoted by a specific event such as a run of depositors, the failure and closure of a 
particular bank, or growth in banks’ past due claims. An important characteristic of 
banking crises is that they usually last longer than currency crises. The peak of a 
banking crisis is the moment at which a significant number of banks, with a 
substantial share in the total assets of the banking system as a whole are closed, or 
when economic authorities began a program of clean-up or rehabilitation. 
 
 
Macroeconomic background of currency and banking crises 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) undertook an extensive empirical analysis of 
the links between currency and banking crises based on a sample of twenty countries
9
. 
                                                 
8
 See Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
9
 The sample included Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996).  
 6 
The sample includes 25 banking and 71 currency crises. The authors’ analysis of the 
chronology of events allowed them to make the following observations about the 
macroeconomic background and effects of crisis: 
 
(1) The types of crises vary in different subperiods: during the seventies, twenty 
currency crises but only three banking crises occurred, mostly due to the high 
degree of financial regulation at the time. In the eighties and nineties, the number 
of balance-of-payments crises did not change substantially, but the number of 
banking crises rose substantially. The authors connect the increased number of 
banking crises with the financial liberalization. 
(2) Using a probit model, the authors evaluated the links between the index of 
currency crisis and the index of banking crisis. Lags of 12 to 36 months were 
used, including a dummy variable for financial liberalization. The results of the 
test show that banking crises significantly aid in the prediction of balance-of-
payments crisis, but not vice versa. 
(3) Twin crises have common roots in the deregulation of the financial system,10 in 
credit expansion and deterioration of the balance-of-payments. 
(4) The external manifestations of crises and the constructed indices of crises usually 
coincide. 
(5) Currency crises are much sharper and more dangerous in emerging market 
economies than in developed economies. 
(6) External factors (foreign interest rates) have a significant role in forecasting 
currency crisis. In this respect, the authors’ views converge with some previous 
studies (for example Frankel and Rose, 1996, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
1995). 
 
In order to analyze the macroeconomic background of currency crises, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1996) examine the behavior of groups of macroeconomic and financial 
variables one and a half years before the crises, and after the crises. The variables 
used are: real exchange rate, value of exports and imports, terms of trade, index of 
production, M1, international reserves, M2/international reserves and the difference 
between domestic and foreign interest rates. 
 
The authors argue that declines in economic activity or recessions usually precede 
currency crises. In this, they do not diverge from previous studies that show that the 
rate of unemployment is high during the period preceding currency crises.
11
 Which 
unusual changes one can find in the behavior of individual variables in the immediate 
pre-crisis period and immediately after the start of the crisis? 
 
A strong appreciation of the currency before the start of the crisis negatively 
affects exports, which are on average 20% lower at the onset of crises than in normal 
periods. Because of decreases in overall economic activity in the pre-crisis period 
imports may reach their lowest rate of growth (or even fall) as early as a year before 
the crisis. After the crisis, imports tend to recover slowly. Deterioration in the terms 
of trade leads currency crisis by about twelve months, and of course can lead to 
decreases in output. If the economic authorities devalue in order to overcome negative 
                                                 
10
 The authors find that financial liberalization had occurred in the 5 years preceding 70% of the 
banking crises. Also, the financial liberalization dummy was significant in all the specifications used 
for predicting banking crises, but not in the specifications used for predicting currency crises. 
11
 For example Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) 
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trends in exports and output, a “bad” equilibrium is possible in which expectations 
about the growth of nominal wages further harms competitiveness and creates 
pressure for further devaluation. Analysis of particular cases shows that recovery is a 
very slow process that may last as long as one and a half years from the start of the 
crisis, despite measures to improve the terms of trade. 
 
Monetary policy usually becomes expansive about six months before the start of 
currency crises. In the pre-crisis period, almost all monetary aggregates usually grow. 
The danger of a gradual and permanent loss of foreign exchange reserves grows, and 
high interest rate differentials
12
 immediately before the crisis may be a sign of 
increased risk premia or monetary policy tightening to preserve international reserves. 
 
In the analysis of the macroeconomic environment in which banking crises occur, 
the authors add a number of financial and monetary variables to the indicators of 
currency crisis.
13
 These variables provide a more detailed picture of the pre and post-
crisis behavior: index of securities prices, bank lending to the private sector, money 
multipliers (M1/M0, M2/M0), real deposit interest rates and commercial bank 
deposits. 
 
At cyclical peaks, bank leverage is at its highest. Optimistic expectations lead to 
increased credit activity by the banking sector. Such increased lending can begin as 
much as 18 months prior to the start of the banking crisis, and may be stimulated by 
capital inflows and financial liberalization. However, economic reversal along with 
worsened terms of trade and weakening on securities markets and real estate markets, 
decreases the profitability of banks’ clients. Many firms become unable to service 
their obligations in a timely manner. The riskiness of a large portion of banks’ 
portfolios increases, imperiling the health of the whole banking system. A recession 
usually begins about twelve months before serious banking sector problems emerge, 
and the fall in economic activity is reflected almost immediately in the securities and 
real estate markets. With the recession, depositors’ fears about the stability of 
particular financial institutions and the banking system as a whole increase. 
Depositors’ behavior, in turn, may further weaken the financial system of the country. 
 
In the majority of the countries studied, the authors note strong effects of the 
money multiplier in the pre-crisis period. They see this as a result of decreases in 
reserve requirements, which are certainly the result of the financial deregulation 
process in late seventies and early eighties. Financial reforms were one cause of the 
growth in real interest rates, which in pre-crisis periods exceed normal rates by at 
least 1%. High real interest rates are in part an expression of the measures taken by 
the central bank to control the liquidity of the banking system to defend the value of 
the currency. However, such steps may push a fragile banking system step by step 
into crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Calvo (1995) and Obstfield (1994, 1996) see the interest rate differential as one of the key variables 
that makes a crisis self-fulfilling. 
13
 Terms of trade, index of production, real exchange rate and international reserves. 
 8 
2.2. The traditional approach to analyzing the cause of crises  
 
When examining the methodological attempts to find economic variables that 
provide early warning of currency or banking crises, we can separate two key 
approaches: the traditional approach and the most recent “signals” (nonparametric) 
approach. The first approach generally tries to use econometric tests to find the 
causes of balance-of-payments crises. Those studies that provide qualitative 
description of pre-crisis events
14
 can also be considered traditional. The same is the 
case with various parametric and nonparametric tests of the influence of particular 
variables on exchange rate stability
15
 and various estimates of the probability of 
currency crisis based on explicit theoretical models. This last method has developed 
under the methodological influence of Blanco and Garber (1986), who are pioneers in 
estimating the probability of currency crisis.
16
 Although the majority of works are 
focused on the causes of currency crisis, more recent works include studies of early 
warning indicators of banking crises.
17
 
 
Despite various attempts to differentiate approaches, the traditional methodology 
for estimating the probability of crisis is quite uniform.
18
 That is, studies using this 
methodology most often define crises via an index of pressure on the foreign 
exchange market.
19
 This index is influenced by changes in international reserves, 
exchange rate and interest rate. The probability of crisis is estimated via probit or logit 
models with maximum likelihood estimation. Most often, the models test whether 
spillover effects played a significant role in currency crises. Because of the 
assumption that worsening economic conditions gradually culminate in a crisis, the 
models use lagged variables. 
 
The advantage of the traditional method (estimation of the probability of crisis) is 
its simple interpretation. All information about a future crisis is contained in a single 
number. However, it seems that this advantage is also a disadvantage of the method. 
This approach does not allow the researcher to rate indicators according to their 
relative predictive power. Either variables are significant or they are not, and if they 
occasionally send incorrect signals, the methodology cannot detect this. This 
                                                 
14
 See Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) 
15
 Some studies compare the behavior of variables in pre-crisis periods with their behavior in “normal” 
period in countries in the same group (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995; Frankel and Rose 1996). 
Others compare the behavior of variables in countries with currency crisis with the behavior of the 
same variables that did not suffer currency crises (Edward 1989, Kamin 1988). 
16
 Authors used these methods in analyzing the Mexican crisis of the early eighties. Frankel and Rose 
(1996) continue this tradition (sample of 105 developing countries), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(1996) analyze the spill-over effects between twenty developed countries, and Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco (1996) analyze the Tequila effects. Some studies used these methods to analyze particular 
cases of devaluation (Cumby and Wijnbergen 1989, Ötker and Pazarbasioglu 1994, 1995); some 
compare differences in the degree of exchange rate disturbance between countries (Edin and Vredin 
1993, Edwards 1989, Klein and Marion 1994). Recent works, that of Krguer, Osakwe and Page (1998) 
uses a sample of 19 developing countries to study whether currency crises are results of deterioration in 
economic conditions or spill-over effects. 
17
 For example Hardy and Pazabasioglu (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). 
18
 The studies which confirm this uniformity of approach are: Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 
1996) and Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998). 
19
 Using this method, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) identify 77 currency crises in the 
years 1959 to 1973. 
 9 
methodology hardly could tell us what “went wrong” in global economic activity as 
well as how to reformulate economic policy to avoid a crisis.  
 
 
2.3. The “signals” approach —an overview of the method 
 
The “signals” approach attempts to overcome the difficulties and limitations 
faced by the traditional method in building a specific early warning system for 
currency and banking crises. The starting point is that disturbances that may lead to 
crisis do not happen accidentally, but are the result of gradual deterioration in 
economic conditions. This approach begins with a detailed analysis of the behavior of 
variables whose movements in the pre-crisis period differ substantially from their 
usual behavior in normal economic conditions. A substantial deviation of a variable 
(either below or above the trend) is seen as a warning signal of possible currency or 
banking crisis. The “signals” approach was founded by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996) as an alternative method which facilitates deeper understanding of the 
behavior of the macroeconomic forces that pushed the country into crisis. The idea of 
developing a system of economic indicators that can anticipate crises derives from the 
literature on business cycles and the methods used to forecast business cycle turning 
points.
20
 The “signals” approach is a very young one. In the future, one can expect a 
more detailed empirical testing of the usefulness of the method for analytical and 
forecasting purposes.
21
 
 
The difficulties in creating such an early warning system for Croatia include 
the short time horizon for analysis and the fact that experience in using such models is 
inadequate. Although the economists engaged in this field generally agree on key 
methodological steps, the method itself allows some analytical flexibility to take into 
account variations in the economic situations in particular countries. Therefore, in this 
section we will first examine the method itself, including its key definitions and 
analytic criteria. After this, we will provide a short overview of the most important 
empirical results from tests of the method in the analysis of currency and banking 
crises in various countries, with special attention to transition countries. 
 
 
Defining crises and choices of potential indicators 
 
Banking crisis are most often defined by a particular event: a bank run, the 
closure of a bank, the take over or merger of a bank, or the beginning of a 
rehabilitation program for an “unhealthy” bank. Currency crises are defined as 
situations in which speculative attacks on the currency lead to a substantial 
deprecation, a substantial decrease in international reserves or a combination of one 
and the other. This approach rests on a broad definition that includes both successful 
and unsuccessful attacks on various exchange rate regimes. 
 
                                                 
20
 This refers to the well-known barometric method that is used to monitor and forecast economic 
activity. In Croatia, the so-called CROLEI (CROatian Leading Economic Indicators) system has been 
developing for almost six years to monitor and forecast overall economic activity. 
21
 Thus, it is not strange that several studies have already appeared examining the possibilities of using 
this method to analyze banking and currency crises. See  Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), 
Kaminsky (1998), Berg and Pattillo (1998), Bruggemann and Linne (1999). 
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As in the original leading indicator’s approach, the key step in the analysis is 
the definition of the reference series whose behavior is analyzed and predicted by the 
system of warning indicators.
22
 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) suggest that currency 
crises should be identified by the behavior of an “index of foreign exchange market 
pressure”. This index is a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in the 
exchange rate (defined as units of domestic currency per $US or per German mark) 
and the monthly percentage changes in total international reserves (with a negative 
sign). Because of the depreciation of the currency and because of the decreased 
international reserve the exchange market pressure index grows, expressing strong 
pressure on domestic currency. A period in which the index is more than three 
standard deviations above its average value is defined as a crisis period. However, this 
condition should be modified in countries experiencing high inflation: periods must 
be divided into periods of lower and higher inflation, with separate calculation of the 
index for each sub-period. 
 
The choice of potential signaling indicators whose behavior in the pre-crisis 
period is to be tested is based on theory and on the availability of monthly data. In the 
analyses of currency crises undertaken so far (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996; 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 1997) the following variables have been found to 
provide signals about upcoming currency crises: international reserves, imports and 
exports, terms of trade, real exchange rate and its deviation from trend, the differential 
between domestic and foreign real interest rates on deposits, the difference between 
real M1 and an estimated demand for money), money multiplier (M2), domestic 
credit/GDP, real deposit interest rates, the ratio of nominal lending to deposit interest 
rates, the stock of deposits at commercial banks, M4/international reserves, the index 
of output and the index of equity prices. Other than the real exchange rate and interest 
rates, all these variables are expressed as annual growth rates. 
 
 
The signal horizon 
 
The signal horizon is the period before the crisis during which the behavior of the 
indicators signals the upcoming crisis. The time horizon can vary from one to two 
years, so the majority of authors chose a period of 18 months before the start of the 
crisis. For banking crisis, the analysis often continues in the post-crisis period, to 
follow the development of the macroeconomic situation in general and the recovery of 
the banking system. 
 
Signals and critical values (thresholds) 
 
The indicators provide signals when they substantially differ from their trend. That is, 
when the deviation exceeds certain critical values, a signal is sent. The critical values 
are set to achieve a certain balance between the risk of sending false signals (noise) 
and the risk of ignoring good signals of a crisis that is in fact impending. The optimal 
critical values are defined as those that minimize the noise-to-signal ratio (the ratio of 
false to good signals). 
 
                                                 
22
 For example, the key reference series in the Croatian CROLEI system of indicators is the index of 
industrial production. 
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The usefulness of indicators for predictive purposes can be examined through 
a “scoring system” of potential indicators. The scoring system is based on: 
(1) estimates of the forecasting ability of each potential indicator, 
(2) estimates of the “lead-time” of indicators, 
(3) estimates of the persistence of their signals. 
 
The most important criterion for assessing the effectiveness of indicators is the 
confirmation of their reliability in signaling future crisis. The performance of each 
indicator can be estimated in terms of following matrix (Table 1): 
 
Table 1 
MATRIX OF ESTIMATION OF POTENTIAL INDICATORS (within 2 years) 
 
 crisis no crisis 
signal exist 
signal does not exist 
A 
C 
B 
D 
     Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) 
 
In above matrix, A is the number of months in which the indicator issued good 
signs for upcoming crisis, B is the number of months with bad signal (noise), C is the 
number of months without a signal but a crisis follows, and D is the number of months 
without a signal and no crisis follows. 
 
This matrix shows four “ideal” cases, since in reality no indicator will really 
satisfy the criteria of the matrix. However, the matrix is useful in establishing which 
indicators are closer and which are farther from the ideal characteristics. An ideal 
indicator is one that produces a signal in every month within the signal horizon (1 to 2 
years) before a crisis, so that A>0 and C=0, or one which does not produce any 
signals in time horizon that is not to be followed by a crisis, so that D<0 and B=0. 
 
Based on this matrix, it is possible to calculate measures that serve to help in 
ranking indicators according to their predictive power. Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1997) propose calculating the percentage of crises correctly predicted as the 
percentage of total crises for which the indicator provides at least one signal during 
the signaling horizon (1 or 2 years).
23
  
 
The next measure derived from the matrix is the share of good signals in total 
signals, expressed as A/(A+C). In this case, the maximum score (100%) would belong 
to an indicator that sent signals in every month within the signaling horizon before 
every observed crisis. It is also possible to calculate the number of bad signals (noise) 
sent by an indicator, as well as the share of bad signals in the number of months in 
which false signals could have been sent (B/B+D). 
 
The key measure calculated on the basis of the matrix is the adjusted noise-to-
signal ratio. The noise-to-signal ratio provides information about the success of the 
indicator in producing good signals and avoiding false signals. This ratio is calculated 
                                                 
23
 Thus, for example a score of 100% would mean that the indicator produces at least one good signal 
within the signaling horizon before each crisis. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) calculated that 
the indicators chosen for their sample of countries succeeded in signaling about 70% of the total 
number of currency crises observed. 
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as the simple ratio between the above two measures (B/(B+D)/A/(A+C)). The lower 
this ratio is for a particular indicator, the more successful is the indicator in predicting 
future currency or banking crises. The adjusted noise-to-signal ratio is considered the 
key measure in the choice of a short list of the best leading indicators of crisis. 
Therefore, all those variables whose noise-to-signal ratio is equal to or greater than 
one are removed from the analysis. The last measure for estimating the quality of the 
signal is the comparison of the probability of crisis conditional on a signal from the 
indicator (A/(A+B) with the unconditional probability of a crisis (A+C)/(A+B+C+D). 
The conditional probability is greater than the unconditional one only for those 
indicators that have predictive power. 
 
The choice of the most successful indicators depends on the lead-time of the 
indicator. It is not a matter of indifference if the indicator sends a signal of a crisis in 
twelve months time or in one month’s time. Because of this, it is necessary to 
establish the signal horizon of each individual indicator; i.e. how many months before 
the crisis the indicator produces first warning signal. 
 
The last criterion for assessing an indicator is the confirmation of the 
persistence of the signals during the signal horizon, defined as the average number of 
signals per period. The measure of persistence of the signal is simply the inverse of 
the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio, and expresses the persistence of the signal in the 
pre-crisis period as opposed to the “normal” period. 
 
The main advantages of the “signals” approach are its methodological clarity 
and simplicity. Today, this is not subject to debate among economists. What is subject 
to debate and open questions is the possibility of using this approach in various 
empirical analysis that examine various samples of countries, as well as the quality of 
the information that the signal approach provides to analysts and policymakers. The 
creators of this approach believe that it can be very effective and useful as the basis of 
the construction of an early warning system for currency and banking crises. 
Furthermore, the results of their analysis confirm an existence of a large number of 
indicators that anticipate and signal future crises during the pre-crisis period. The 
authors of the “signals” approach also consider it positive that their approach does not 
substantially differ from other empirical studies based on traditional analytical 
methods.
24
 The Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (KLR, as it is often called in the 
literature) approach has shown the predictive power of a majority of the indicators of 
crisis developed with the traditional techniques in the various studies undertaken to 
date. 
 
 
 
3. Empirical tests of the “signals” approach 
 
In this chapter, I take a more detailed look at the two most important empirical 
tests of the signal method undertaken to date. The first complex empirical test was 
made by Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart, and is based on research on currency crises in 
                                                 
24
 Berg and Pattillo (1998), who test three models for predicting currency crises, come to this 
conclusion. Those three models are: the “signals” (Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart) approach, the probit 
model for a large sample of countries proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996) and the regression analysis 
based on time series from a large sample of countries done by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).  
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a sample of various countries. The second is a newer study that represents an 
interesting attempt to apply the signal approach to a smaller sample of transition 
countries. For our research, this study is especially important because its analysis 
includes twin crises, and because the countries studied have passed through the 
transition process and continue to face similar problems and challenges to those 
Croatia faces. 
 
 
3.1. Testing the system of “early warning” for currency crises 
 
Before beginning to test the “signals” approach on a large sample of countries, 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) carefully examined empirical results from 25 
research studies.
25
 These studies mainly used the traditional approach for examining 
possible indicators of currency crisis. Summarizing the results of these studies, the 
authors put together a broad list of all the known potential indicators of currency 
crisis. The list includes 103 variables divided into several key categories (see 
Appendix 1). 
 
Based on this list, the authors attempted to identify indicators with predictive 
power and statistically significant contributions to the analysis of currency crises. 
They were aware that the majority of studies used traditional methods (mainly 
econometric tests and estimates of the probability of crisis) and that the predictive 
power of each indicator was expressed quantitatively. Although there is no simple 
answer to the question which indicators are the best indicators of crisis, most studies 
pointed to the following variables as the most reliable: international reserves, real 
exchange rate, credit expansion, credit to the public sector and the rate of inflation. 
To obtain a predictive system, it was necessary to test other variables as well and to 
take into account the specificity of each national economy.  
 
In order to examine the effectiveness of the “signals” method, the authors 
extended their previous research (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996) and analyzed a total 
of 76 currency crises in the period 1970-1995 in a sample of 15 developing countries 
and 5 developed countries. I will not burden the present discussion with a repetition of 
the original methodological steps taken by the signaling approach, but instead will 
provide a short overview of the main results of the paper. 
 
The authors selected indicators and created a shorter list of 15 reliable 
economic indicators (Table 2). These indicators proved reliable in the majority of 
previous empirical studies of currency crises. All the variables except the real 
exchange rate and interest rates are expressed as annual growth rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Some of them are: Bilson (1979), Blanco and Garber (1986), Cumby and Van Wijnbergen (1989), 
Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Edin and Vredin (1993), Edwards (1989), Edwards and 
Montiel (1989), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Kamin (1988), 
Kaminsky and Leiderman (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Klein and Marion (1994), Krugman 
(1979), Moreno (1995), Otker and Pazarbasioglu  (1994, 1995) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995). 
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Table 2 
POTENTIAL LEADING INDICATORS OF CURRENCY CRISIS 
1. International reserves 
2. Imports 
3. Exports 
4. Terms of trade (ratio of import to export 
unit value) 
5. Deviation of real exchange rate index 
from trend 
6. Difference between domestic and foreign 
real deposit interest rates 
7. Monetary equilibrium (difference  
between M1 and estimated demand  
        for money) 
8. Money multiplier (M2/M0)) 
9. Credit/GDP 
10. Real deposit interest rates 
11. Relation between domestic nominal       
lending and deposit interest rates 
12. Deposits in commercial banks (nominal) 
13. M4/International reserves 
14. GDP index 
15. Index of share prices 
 
Source: Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (1997) 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the authors define currency crises using the index of 
foreign exchange market pressure. The index is a weighted average of the monthly 
percentage change in the exchange rate and in total international reserves (inverted 
series). The weights are chosen so that each component has an equal conditional 
variance. The index rises due to depreciation and decreased international reserves, 
expressing the increased pressure on the currency. This definition of crisis is wide 
enough to cover not only speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes, but also 
attacks on other exchange rate systems. The authors choose a signal horizon of 24 
months before the start of the crisis. All signals sent in that period are considered 
reliable. The indicator gives a signal whenever it substantially deviates from its trend 
beyond a given critical value. For each individual indicator and for each country in 
the sample, the optimal level of deviation
26
 from the mean value is determined. The 
critical value is determined to achieve a balance between the risk of receiving many 
false signals and the risk of missing good signals when a crisis is impending. 
 
Using the matrix, the authors estimate the usefulness of each individual 
indicator. The results of the study are shown in Appendix 2. In the period studied, 
various indicators succeeded in “predicting” almost 70% of the total of crises. This 
means that the indicators produced at least one good signal in the 24 months before 
about 70% of the crises. However, the number of the months in which good signals 
could have been issued (A/(A+C)) introduces considerable strictness in the analysis
27
. 
The authors conclude that the real exchange rate is the one that issued the highest 
percentage of possible good signs (25%), followed by international reserves (22%), 
M2/international reserves (21%), the M2 multiplier (20%), exports and the price of 
securities (17%), and imports (the lowest rate 9%). 
 
The percentage of months in which false signals were possible (B/(B+D)) 
showed that the real exchange rate produced the smallest percentage of bad signals 
                                                 
26
 For example, possible limits for the import variable include growth rates (for each country) for which 
10% of the observations remain above the limit for each country. This percentage is taken as a unified 
criterion for all countries, but within each country this limit can vary. Using a network of reference 
percentage deviations (from 10 to 20%), the authors arrive at an optimal set of limits that minimizes 
signal errors (that is, the relation between incorrect and correct signals). Among the variables whose 
decrease signals crisis (international reserves, exports, terms of trade, deviation of the real exchange 
rate from tend, commercial bank deposits, output) the limit is below the mean, while for the other 
indicators, it is above the mean.  
27
 The maximum percentage would be achieved if a signal was received in every month for every crisis 
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(only 5%), followed by exports (7%), the price of securities and output (8%), the 
share of credit in GDP (9%). The worst indicator was the relationship between 
lending and deposit interest rates (22% false signals). 
 
The adjusted noise-to-signal ratio which is the ratio of the two measures above 
was again best (lowest) for the real exchange rate (0.19), followed by exports (0.42), 
price of securities (0.47), M2/international reserves (0.48), international reserves 
(0.55). The poorer performers included imports (1.16), deposits (1.2) and the relation 
between lending and deposit interest rates (1.69). This measure is crucial in the 
choosing the final list of leading indicators of currency crisis. Variables with scores 
above one were removed from the list. The last measure of the success of an indicator 
is a comparison between the probability of a crisis conditional on a signal from the 
indicator and the unconditional probability of a crisis.
28
 
 
The “lead-time” or number of months in which a particular indicator produces 
its first warning signal before a crisis was acceptable for all 15 indicators examined. 
Signals began between 12 and 18 months before a crisis on average. The longest lead-
time of 17 months belonged to the real exchange rate and real interest rates, which 
again confirms the exceptional predictive power of the real exchange rate variable in 
signaling crisis. 
 
The last criterion the authors discuss is the persistence of early warning 
signals.
29
 The authors found that, for the majority of indicators, signals were sent in 
the pre-crisis period at least twice as frequently as in tranquil times. The only 
exception was the real exchange rate, for which the signal in pre-crisis times was 
more than five times as frequent as in normal economic conditions. 
 
Finally, the authors suggest that a successful warning system requires the 
processing of a large amount of information and the monitoring of the behavior of 
numerous economic indicators. They argue that countries in the sample should put 
their attention on variables that have proven to be the most reliable in predicting crises 
in the past 25 years. Those indicators are as follows: 1) international reserves, 2) real 
exchange rate, 3) domestic credit, 4) credit to the public sector and 5) inflation rate.
30
 
 
 
3.2. The “signals” approach to twin crises—transition countries 
 
The “signals” approach was applied to the sample of transition countries in 
Bruggemann and Linne (1999). The study covered Russia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania during the years 1991 to 1998. Data availability and 
the fact that these countries experienced serious financial problems during the 
observed transition period influenced the choice of countries in the sample.  
 
                                                 
28
 The conditional probability is greater than the unconditional probability only for effective and useful 
indicators. 
29
 This is a simple inverse of the noise-to-signal ratio expressing the existence of a signal in the pre-
crisis period relative to a “peaceful” period. 
30
 Certain additional indicators should not be ignored, although their success measures were lower 
(trade balance, exports, money supply growth, real GDP growth, fiscal deficit). 
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The authors are most interested in whether all the countries studied shared 
some common macroeconomic features that led to the currency or banking crises. 
They begin with an analysis of events in each country separately, following the 
behavior of indicators before and after the currency or banking crisis, with the aim of 
identifying the vulnerability of the economies studied. 
 
In defining crises, the authors pass over the K-L-R approach to constructing an 
index of the foreign exchange market pressure as a measure of currency crisis. 
Instead, they focus only on events that describe currency and banking crises. Table 3 
display the events that the authors marked as the beginning of banking or currency 
crises in the transition economies studied. These events formed the basis of their tests 
of the usefulness of signal approach in these specific conditions. 
 
Table 3 
EVENTS CHARACTERIZING “TWIN” CRISES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
 BANKING CRISIS CURRENCY CRISIS 
Czech Republic August 1996 
Closing of 8 banks 
May 1997 
After 10 days of speculative attacks, 
the fixed exchange rate system was 
abandoned 
Russia August 1998 
Big jump of interest rates 
Growth of share of short-term debt 
in total foreign debt, 
Bank closures 
August 1998 
Devaluation of the ruble, change to a 
fluctuating exchange rate regime 
Bulgaria March 1996 
Failure of the agricultural bank and 
beginning of the process of closing 
almost half of the banks in the 
banking system 
January 1997 
Introduction of currency board after a 
period of hyperinflation 
Hungary December 1993 
“Bad” loans reach almost 20% of 
total 
December 1994 
Introduction of urgent savings 
measures as current account deficit 
reaches  9.4% of GDP 
Romania December 1996 
“Bad” loans reach 39% of total, and 
end up at 57% in 1997 
January 1997 
Romanian lei devalued by 20% in 
one week 
Source: Bruggemann and Linne (1999) 
 
In the pre-crisis and post-crisis period, 16 economic and financial variables 
were analyzed. The data were obtained from the national statistics of the countries 
studied. The variables are divided below into groups representing key areas of 
economic life with signs that express the theoretical presumptions about their 
behavior in a pre-crisis period: 
 
I Fiscal variables 
 
The budget deficit/GDP, nominal (+) – although this variable most often grows before currency crisis, this is 
not necessarily the case before banking crises. The presumption is that this indicator may grow after banking 
crises because of the high costs of programs to help (rehabilitate) banking systems. 
 
II Monetary variables 
 
M2 multiplier (+) - it is presumed that both kinds of crisis are closely connected to the growth of the domestic 
banking system, which is aided by financial liberalization. This leads to decreased reserve requirements and 
growth in the money multiplier. 
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Domestic credit/GDP, nominal (+)—credit expansion follows financial deregulation and cyclical “overheating”. 
It precedes banking and currency crises. After a currency crisis, credit activity decreases sharply, banks become 
more cautious, and total economic growth slows. 
Bank deposits (-)—this expresses a run on banks, a main indication of a banking crisis. Decreases in bank 
deposits indicate a loss of confidence in the health of the banking system before banking crises. 
 
III Current account 
 
Exports (-)—currency crises often are closely correlated with overvalued real exchange rates in the pre-crisis 
period. Therefore, exports is to be expected to fall in this period; decreased competitiveness and increased 
business failures put further pressure on the banking system. 
Imports (+)—theoretical presumptions are not entirely clear (sometimes contradictory) in this area. Appreciation 
stimulates imports, but decreases in exports lead to slower economic growth and decrease import demand. 
Real exchange rate (-)—banking crises can occur because of strong appreciation that hinders competitiveness 
and makes foreign loans expensive. 
 
IV Capital account 
 
International reserves in US dollars (-) - it is expected to fall before a currency crisis because of monetary 
authority’s measures to defend the exchange rate. However, a fall may also be expected in a banking crisis. This 
variable is a traditional measure of an economy’s ability to finance imports. 
M2/international reserves (+)—this variable is expected to rise before financial crises (resident increasingly 
convert domestic money into foreign). 
Real interest rate differential (+) – a sharp increase is to be expected in banking as well as in currency crises as 
a measure to stem capital flight 
Foreign debt (+)—this variable is “dangerous” if financial markets believe that the foreign debt is unsustainable. 
Short term foreign debt (+) – an increase in short term debt points to rising difficulties in rolling over foreign 
debt due to the increased risk; excessive exposure to financial markets leads to an increased vulnerability of 
macroeconomic situation.   
Capital flight (+)— this variable is closely related to decreases in bank deposits, since usually it is domestic 
residents who are the first to anticipate impending crises. Increased capital flight can intensify a currency crisis, 
and can further deepen a banking crisis. 
 
V Economic growth 
 
Output (-)—an overvalued exchange rate and a fall in exports decrease economic activity before the beginning 
of a banking or currency crisis. While the effect of a recession on a currency crisis is direct, in the case of a 
banking crisis the effect is indirect (via the overvalued exchange rate, which lowers marginal profits, worsening 
credit portfolios of banks.  
Real domestic interest rates (+)—high interest rates may be sign of liquidity problems, disturbances in the 
banking system or recession. 
Lending/deposit interest rates (+)—This variable expressed the fall in the “quality” of loans. Deterioration in 
the credit portfolio may occur because of negative selection and moral hazard. 
 
 
The authors use various numbers of months for the signal horizon in analyzing 
these variables. Signals emitted within the 18 months before a crisis are considered 
good signals. In the case of banking crises, the analysis does not stop with the 
beginning of the crisis, but continues in the post-crisis period. A signal of banking 
disturbances is considered reliable if it occurs in the 9 months before the crisis or the 
9 months after the start of the banking crisis. 
 
Estimates of the usefulness of each indicator are made using the matrix. First, 
it is necessary to determine the critical value that separates sustainable from 
unsustainable behavior of the indicator. When the optimal critical value is established 
for all the observations of a single indicator, that value is used as a specific critical 
value applicable only to that particular variable and that particular country.
31
 
                                                 
31
 For example, it is possible to establish that the limit that minimizes the measure of false signals for 
all observations of the current account balance of various countries at 12%. Then all monthly 
observations above this boundary are used as signals of crisis. However, it is necessary to be especially 
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Results of the analysis for the transition countries 
 
The authors found a set of indicators providing early warnings of currency and 
banking crises in transition countries. For the whole sample, the best signal indicator 
was exports with the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio of 0.12 for currency crises and 0.24 
for banking crises. Those variables with the ratio above one were excluded: imports, 
interest rate differentials, world interest rates and capital flight. Furthermore, in 
transition countries studied, Kaminsky's (1998) statement that a substantial growth in 
foreign debt and strong capital inflows usually precede crises was only partially 
confirmed. The results show that “liquidity” is more important in currency crises in 
transition countries than elsewhere. “Liquidity” is defined as the share of short-term 
debt in total foreign debt, and has a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.24. 
 
The authors were very aware of the problem of twin crises, concluding that it 
is much more difficult to anticipate banking crises than attacks on the currency. The 
mean value of the noise-to-signal ratio for all indicators considered for all five 
countries was 0.75 for banking crises and 0.59 for currency crises (calculated on the 
basis of the data from Table 4). However, it must be taken into account that the results 
for banking crises are strongly influenced by the behavior of imports and world 
interest rates with very high values of the ratio. Therefore, the authors measure the 
median value of the noise-to-signal ratio instead of the average, and this gives a 
completely different picture. The medium value of the ratio of all indicators is 0.30 
for banking crises and 0.49 for currency crises. It is evident that a large number of the 
indicators relating to the domestic financial system in fact fulfill the authors’ 
expectations, since they provide strong and accurate signals of banking crises. Bank 
deposits, the money multiplier and the share of domestic credit in GDP provide 
especially useful signals. 
 
Table 4 
THE ADJUSTED NOISE-TO-SIGNAL RATIO —TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
INDICATOR CURRENCY CRISIS BANKING CRISIS 
Budget deficit/GDP 0.13 0.30 
M2 multiplier 
Domestic credit/GDP 
Bank deposits  
0.94 
0.36 
0.25 
0.69 
0.30 
0.12 
Exports 
Imports 
Real exchange rate 
0.12 
1.70 
0.37 
0.24 
2.77 
0.53 
Foreign exchange reserves 
M2/reserves 
Real interest rate differential 
World interest rate 
Foreign debt 
Capital flight 
Short-term foreign debt 
0.31 
0.33 
1.05 
1.08 
0.63 
1.26 
0.24 
0.24 
0.35 
0.14 
4.80 
0.33 
0.95 
0.16 
Gross domestic product 
Real interest rates 
Lending/deposit interest rates  
0.69 
0.60 
0.13 
0.28 
0.80 
0.25 
Source: Bruggemann and Linne, 1999, p.15 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
cautious here, since a current account deficit of 4% may be a problem for one country, and not for other 
countries in the sample. 
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The currency crisis in the Czech Republic was preceded by numerous signals. 
Almost 80% of the indicators tested sent signals at various time lags within 18 months 
before the currency crisis. Although the behavior of these variables worsened 
considerably within this period, the majority of them did not pass the critical degree 
of deviation from trend. About 40% of the indicators sent signals half a year before 
and 56% four months before the crisis. It seems that the crisis occurred because of 
worsened domestic economic conditions and not, for example, because of the 
influence of the Asian crisis. They conclude this because imports, foreign debt, real 
interest rates and capital flight did not send any signals in the pre-crisis period. After 
the currency crisis in May 1997, the majority of the variables observed returned 
within normal bounds far from their critical values. The exception was bank deposits, 
which stayed in the critical area, increasing worries about the Czech banking system. 
 
The hyperinflationary period in Bulgaria affected almost all variables 
strongly. However, signals were much weaker than in the Czech Republic. Although 
the deterioration in economic conditions was noted in all variables, none of the 
variables crossed their critical values. The budget deficit, domestic credit and 
international reserves sent the strongest signals, and domestic interest rates, imports 
and the foreign debt sent the weakest signals. In Bulgaria, unlike the Czech Republic, 
some indicators continued to give warning signals even after the crisis. Exports and 
gross domestic product fell and domestic credit rose. 
 
Hungary was, along with Romania, the country with least useful indicators signaling 
BOP difficulties and banking problems. Surprisingly, exports and the real exchange 
rate did not provide signals. Hungary was unique in that its imports, contrary to all 
expectations, played the role of a signal indicator. In addition to imports, the useful 
warning indicators were the growth of credit, the share of short-term debt in total 
foreign debt, interest rate differentials and bank deposits. Even after the crisis year of 
1994, interest rate differentials did not return to their normal range. This does not 
necessarily represent a great danger, since Hungary has large capital needs. During 
1998, domestic credit again rose sharply. This could be the sign of a new cycle of 
prosperity or a cyclical “overheating”.  
 
Among the transition countries studied, Romania had the least number of 
indicators with signaling power. Only five of the total number of variables produced 
signals in the pre-crisis period: industrial production, deficit/GDP, exports, real 
exchange rate and M2 multiplier. However, these variables did not return to their 
normal range after the crisis, although signals were weaker than in 1996.  
 
In analyzing the Russian economy, as many as nine indicators were found 
with satisfactory signaling properties suggesting that the Russian crisis was mainly 
the result of domestic disturbances and weakened economic conditions, rather than 
the effect of the Asian crisis. Real exchange rate, deficit/GDP, exports, domestic 
credit, reserves and M2/reserves were a complex of variables that provided a good 
picture of the state of the Russian economy even in the first nine months of 1998. 
 
The authors considered these results quite heartening, since they show that 
transition countries, despite their specificities, share numerous common 
characteristics with other market economies. Analyzing the behavior of signaling 
indicators in transition economies, the authors conclude that currency and banking 
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crises in these countries were not the effect of “contagion” (the spill-over effect of 
crises in other areas) but mainly “domestic” in character. The authors argue that the 
Russian crisis was a twin crisis; the Czech crisis was mainly a currency crisis, and the 
Hungarian crisis mainly a banking crisis. They are aware that their research has its 
limitations
32
, since the classification of crisis and the separate analysis of currency 
and banking crisis is still an area open for discussion. Although there have not been 
many empirical tests of this very young method, the “signals” approach has shown its 
usefulness in studying the development of an early warning system for possible 
economic disturbances. In this way, policymakers would have information on which 
to base prompt policy changes to perhaps eventually avoid economic crises. 
 
 
4. How early warning system of currency and banking crises works 
in Croatia? 
 
The empirical tests of the “signals” method used in transition countries cannot 
be applied to the Croatian case uncritically. There is still not enough empirical 
experience in the application of the method. Above all, the time horizon is too small. 
In Croatia, it is even smaller than in other transition countries, since it only includes 
the post-stabilization period. 
 
 
4.1. Defining banking and currency crisis in Croatia 
 
The first step in applying the “signals” approach is to identify the important 
events, whether relating to the currency or banking sector in Croatia in the period 
January 1995-May 1999. There was no real currency crisis in Croatia in that period. 
This can be seen from the Croatian index of foreign exchange market pressure, 
calculated according to the KLR signaling approach (figure 1). Since we have 
inverted the exchange rate variable, in our case the index of pressure decreases due to 
depreciation of the domestic currency. It also decreases when international reserves 
(in US dollars) fall. Even using a criterion
33
 of one standard deviation from the mean, 
the index of exchange market pressure does not indicate a currency crisis in the 
referent period, since a crisis must end in a substantial devaluation or a change in the 
exchange rate regime. Instead, we see a mild currency disturbance culminating at the 
beginning of 1999. However, that disturbance can be considered a “crisis” for 
analytical purposes, to facilitate the search for early warning indicators of the foreign 
exchange market pressure of January-February 1999.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The newness of the signaling approach and the problems of small samples apply to this study of only 
five transition countries. 
33
 The use of the criterion of three standard deviations would leave us without any reference events 
during the period that we could characterize as a currency disturbance. 
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Figure 1. 
INDEX OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE IN CROATIA 
 
A banking crisis begun in March 1998 with the failure of Dubrovačka banka, 
the fifth biggest bank in Croatia by size, with a share of 5% in total banking assets. 
The decision on the rehabilitation of the bank was made in April 1998. In July 1998, 
Dubrovačka was joined by Glumina banka (sixth by size with a 3% share in total 
banking assets). While the possibility of rehabilitation of Glumina banka was rejected 
by the Croatian National Bank in September 1999, bankruptcy proceedings were not 
opened until March 1999. By the end of 1998, Županjska banka (2% share), 
Komercijalna banka, and Gradska banka Osijek (seventh in size, 2% share) failed. 
These banks went into bankruptcy in March 1999.
34
 In January 1999, Croatia banka 
(2% of total banking assets) went into crisis, and in the same month the Croatian 
National Bank introduced a new liquidity loan collateralized by long-term 
government securities for a group of “crisis” banks. In mid 1999, 1.1 billion HRK 
(HRK - Croatian kuna) of liquidity loans were outstanding, representing 12% of base 
money. 
 
The Croatian case conforms to the pattern that banking crises precede 
currency crises, last longer than currency crises and peak months after the failure of 
the first bank. In Croatia, the banking crisis began almost a year before the currency 
disturbance, during the beginning of a recession, and reached its peak at the end of 
1998 and the beginning of 1999. The reference events for using the method in Croatia 
are therefore: 
Currency “crisis” Banking Crisis 
February 1999 March 1998 
 
                                                 
34
 In addition to these banks, some smaller banks and savings banks failed: Neretvansko-gospodarska 
banka, Građanska štedionica Karlovac, Ilirija banka and Invest štedionica. 
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4.2. Potential indicators and signal horizon 
 
Given the theoretical presumptions about the behavior of variables in a pre-
crisis period the potential signaling indicators used in the study on Croatia represent 
key areas of economic life in Croatia: 
 
1. Bank deposits, total (deposits at commercial banks, calculated as M4 minus currency in 
circulation) 
2. Total domestic credits (commercial bank claims on other domestic sectors, other banking 
institutions and other financial institutions) 
3. M4 multiplier (M4/M0) 
4. M4/foreign assets of the Croatian National Bank (CNB) 
5. Commercial bank loans to enterprises 
6. Commercial bank loans to household 
7. CNB claims on central government (HRK and foreign exchange loans and matured claims 
on the government budget) 
8. Exports, total, US dollars 
9. Imports, total, US dollars 
10. Real effective exchange rate (calculated via consumer prices) 
11. International Reserves, US dollars 
12. Foreign debt, total, US dollars 
13. Short-term foreign debt 
14. Budget deficit 
15. Industrial production, total 
16. Gross domestic product, quarterly, 1990 prices (extrapolated to monthly data) 
17. Real domestic interest rates (interest rates on the Zagreb Money Market minus the annual 
rate of change of consumer prices) 
18. Lending/deposit interest rates ratio (interest rates on HRK loans and deposits not indexed 
to foreign exchange). 
 
The observation period extends from 1994 to the first half of 1999. The series 
are expressed as annual growth rates (with the exception of budget deficit, interest 
rates and exchange rate). For the currency crisis, the signal horizon is 18 months 
before the disturbance. Signals emitted in that period are considered reliable.
35
 In 
tranquil times, every signal indicating a disturbance is considered false. For banking 
crisis, the signal horizon is mainly limited to 12 months before the failure of the first 
bank. Because of the nature of the banking crisis, monetary variables are monitored 
even after this crisis event. 
 
We used the matrix mentioned in previous section to analyze the performance 
of potential indicators. In the Croatian case, it was not possible to calculate the 
percentage of crises predicted, since this would require a longer series and more than 
two crisis events. It was possible to calculate the share of good signals in the signal 
horizon, the share of false signals in the tranquil times and the adjusted noise-to signal 
ratio. 
 
 
4.3 The most successful signal indicators for “twin” crisis in Croatia 
 
The results of the initial research efforts to find an early warning system for 
banking and currency crisis in Croatia are shown in Tables 5 and 6. On this basis, I 
                                                 
35
 A signal horizon of 24 months was used for the variables: total credits, M4 multiplier, M4/CNB 
foreign assets, imports, exports, international reserves, real domestic interest rates. 
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will draw some conclusions about the possibilities and limits of using this method for 
Croatia. 
 
Table 5 
SUCCESS OF INDICATORS IN SIGNALING CURRENCY CRISIS-CROATIA 
 
INDICATOR %good 
signals 
%false 
signals 
noise-to-signal ratio lead-time persistence 
of signal* 
 A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)/A/(A+C)]   
Bank deposits 
Total credits 
M4 multiplier 
M4/ CNB foreign assets 
DMB’s loans to enterprises 
DMB’s loans to households 
CNB claims on central government 
83.3 
37.5 
45.8 
33.3 
37.5 
41.7 
50.0 
22.6 
35.0 
36.0 
40.0 
35.0 
30.0 
16.0 
0.27 
0.93 
0.79 
1.20 
0.93 
0.72 
0.32 
17 
24 
20 
23 
24 
24 
15 
3.70 
1.07 
1.27 
0.83 
1.07 
1.39 
3.13 
Exports 
Imports 
Real exchange rate 
International reserves 
Foreign debt, total 
Short-term foreign debt 
41.7 
37.5 
50.0 
50.0 
38.9 
55.6 
35.1 
40.5 
20.0 
37.5 
25.0 
12.5 
0.84 
1.08 
0.40 
0.75 
0.64 
0.23 
17 
22 
18 
21 
17 
18 
1.19 
0.93 
2.50 
1.33 
1.56 
4.35 
Budget deficit 50.0 20.9 0.41 9 2.44 
Industrial production 
Gross domestic product 
55.6 
61.1 
35.5 
32.3 
0.64 
0.53 
9 
17 
1.56 
1.89 
Real domestic interest rate 
Lending/deposit interest rate ratio 
45.8 
61.1 
20.0 
25.8 
0.44 
0.42 
21 
15 
2.27 
2.38 
DMB – domestic money banks, commercial banks 
*The persistence of a signal is the simple inverse of the noise-to-signal ratio and expresses the persistence of a 
signal in the pre-crisis period relative to “normal” times. 
 
   
Table 6 
SUCCESS OF INDICATORS IN SIGNALING BANKING CRISIS-CROATIA 
INDICATOR %good 
signals 
%false 
signals 
noise-to-signal ratio lead-time persistence 
of signal* 
 A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)/A/(A+C)]   
Bank deposits 
Total credits 
M4 multiplier 
M4/ CNB foreign assets 
DMB’s loans to enterprises 
DMB’s loans to households 
CNB claims on central government 
94.4 
83.3 
50.0 
66.7 
50.0 
75.0 
33.3 
24.0 
28.6 
41.4 
38.1 
33.3 
28.6 
17.2 
0.25 
0.34 
0.83 
0.57 
0.67 
0.38 
0.52 
7 
12 
9 
12 
12 
12 
4 
4.00 
2.94 
1.20 
1.75 
1.49 
2.63 
1.92 
Exports 
Imports 
Real exchange rate 
International reserves 
Foreign debt, total 
Short-term foreign debt 
33.3 
41.7 
77.8 
52.2 
55.6 
77.8 
39.5 
39.5 
20.7 
33.3 
33.3 
16.7 
1.18 
0.95 
0.27 
0.64 
0.60 
0.21 
6 
9 
8 
12 
6 
7 
0.85 
1.05 
3.70 
1.56 
1.67 
4.76 
Budget deficit 22.2 21.9 0.99 5 1.01 
Industrial production 
Gross domestic product 
33.3 
66.7 
37.9 
31.0 
1.14 
0.47 
3 
6 
0.88 
2.13 
Real domestic interest rate 
Lending/deposit interest rate ratio 
41.7 
66.7 
27.0 
24.1 
0.65 
0.36 
10 
4 
1.54 
2.78 
DMB- deposit money banks 
*The persistence of a signal is the simple inverse of the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio and expresses the persistence 
of a signal in the pre-crisis period relative to tranquil times. 
 
The key measure in choosing the most successful indicators was the adjusted 
noise-to-signal ratio. All variables with the ratio greater than one were excluded from 
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the list. The choice should also depend on the lead-time of each indicator, since it is 
important whether the variable warns of a crisis one-month or many months ahead. 
 
Imports, M4/CNB’s foreign assets, total credits, and commercial bank loans to 
enterprises were excluded from the list of signaling indicators for currency crisis. 
Within the other fourteen variables, there are great differences between the better and 
the inferior warning variables. The most successful indicators for warning about the 
Croatian currency disturbance in February 1999 (with the noise-to-signal ratio in 
parenthesis) are: 
 
 
1) Bank deposits (0.27); 
2) CNB claims on central government (0.32); 
3) Real exchange rate (0.40); 
4) Short-term foreign debt (0.23) 
5) Budget deficit (0.41) 
6) Domestic real interest rates (0.44); 
7) Lending/deposit interest rate ratio (0.42) 
 
 
 
As for other transition countries, short-term foreign debt, and not total foreign 
debt provided a stronger signal. This is not necessarily worrisome, since Croatia is 
only slightly exposed to the world foreign exchange market and the share of short-
term debt in total foreign debt is low. The majority of variables studied (except for the 
budget deficit and industrial production) had long lead-times. The first signals were 
sent at least 15 months before the currency crisis. After the disturbance in February 
1999, most of the indicators settled down to their normal levels well below the critical 
value. The budget deficit was an exception, continuing to grow in nominal terms and 
sliding towards its critical value. The continued decrease in bank deposits after 
February 1999 should be taken with reserve, since monetary statistics excluded four 
banks in bankruptcy in May 1999, resulting in falls in most monetary aggregates. 
 
Although the authors who studied signaling indicators in transition countries 
had trouble anticipating banking crises, the same cannot be said for Croatia. Fourteen 
indicators were found with adequate predictive power, and only exports, imports, the 
budget deficit and industrial production did not have predictive power. The best 
warning indicators of the banking crisis that began in March 1998 (with noise-to-
signal ratio below 0.5) are the following: 
 
 
1) Bank deposits (0.25); 
2) Total credits (0.34); 
3) Commercial bank loans to households (0.38); 
4) Real exchange rate (0.27); 
5) Short-term foreign debt (0.21); 
6) GDP, extrapolated monthly (0.47); 
7) Lending/deposit interest rate ratio (0.36). 
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In addition to monitoring these indicators within the signal horizon, it is 
interesting to follow their behavior during the banking crisis that extended through the 
second half of 1998 and culminated at the beginning of 1999. Total credits grew 
rapidly for almost twelve months before the failure of the fifth bank by size 
Dubrovačka banka. In the second half of 1998, the series stopped providing a signal, 
returning to normal values far from the critical value. However, bank deposits showed 
a downward trend months after the failure of the first bank. The real exchange rate 
began to slide (appreciate) towards the critical value almost eight months before the 
banking crisis. This makes it one of the best indicators of banking problems. Contrary 
to expectations, domestic real interest rates behaved more like a coincident than a 
leading indicator. It rose rapidly during the banking crisis all the way to the currency 
“crisis” in February 1999. The same can be said for international reserves, which 
began to fall after the failure of the first bank. Loans to households and short-term 
foreign debt provided good signals  only within the signal horizon and returned to 
their normal range rapidly after the Dubrovačka banka failure. 
 
At the end of the analysis, a logical question arises: which disturbance do the 
indicators warn of best? The mean value of the noise-to-signal ratio of all indicators is 
0.64 for currency and 0.61 for banking crisis. As in the preceding study, it would be 
better to calculate the median value to exclude the influence of variables with 
extremely high rates of noise. The median value of the noise-to-signal ratio of all 
indicators was 0.64 for currency crisis and 0.58 for the banking crisis. Three variables 
relating to the domestic financial system such as bank deposits, total credits and loans 
to households signaled the banking crisis very accurately and promptly, as would be 
expected. 
 
5. Concluding remarks - should we be satisfied with the system of 
signaling indicators? 
 
The number of signaling indicators that proved useful and accurate in 
predicting a banking crisis and a smaller currency disturbance in Croatia exceeded all 
our expectations. There were many limitations placed upon the inquiry by the 
newness of the method and the availability of data. First, we abstract from the fact 
that Croatia did not experience a true currency crisis resulting in a major devaluation 
or change in exchange rate regime. Because of this, we considered the movements in 
the Croatian index of the foreign exchange market pressure to pass the critical bound 
in January and February 1999 for analytical purposes, even though the disturbance 
was actually mild. 
 
The analysis was also burdened by the fact that there were too few crisis 
events during the period studied to base a fully effective crisis early warning system. 
On the other hand, it is quite heartening that many of the variables studied in the pre-
crisis (and post-crisis) period behaved in harmony with theoretical expectations 
presented in this paper. 
 
The banking crisis in Croatia began in March 1998 and continued through the 
beginning of 1999. The indicators which were most useful in anticipated events in the 
banking system were: bank deposits, total credits, loans to households, real exchange 
rate, short-term foreign debt, GDP and lending/deposit interest rates. The behavior of 
the majority of variables in early 1999 indicates that the situation in the banking 
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system is calming down, and the variables are returning to their normal range. This is 
in accordance with theoretical presumptions that a currency disturbance usually 
occurred months after the first bank failure. The currency disturbance in fact 
happened almost a year after the first major events in the banking system. In the 
second half of 1998, the whole economy went into recession, with the banking crisis 
continuing to build and culminating at the beginning of 1999. The best indicators of 
currency crisis were bank deposits, credit to the public sector, the real exchange rate, 
short-term foreign debt, budget deficit, domestic real interest rates and the relation 
between domestic lending and deposit interest rates. 
 
Despite all the limitations in the use of the “signals” method mentioned above, 
we can be fairly satisfied with the results of our search for an early warning system 
for Croatia. It further heartens us that the results of this analysis do not differ 
significantly from those obtained on the sample of transition countries. However, we 
must be aware that we are only at the beginning of a serious empirical task whose 
final goal is to build an effective early warning system for currency and banking crisis 
in Croatia. The first step has been made to use a very new method, so the group of 
indicators analyzed here can be seen as a basis for further research. The ultimate goal 
is to uncover better and better warning information that will allow policymakers 
enough maneuvering room to avoid or at least minimize the negative consequences of 
future currency and banking crisis in Croatia. 
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Appendix 1 
 
POTENTIAL LEADING INDICATORS OF CURRENCY CRISIS 
 
A. CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
International reserves 
Capital flows (short-term) 
Foreign direct investment 
Differences between domestic and foreign 
interest rates 
 
B. FOREIGN DEBT 
Total foreign debt 
Foreign debt of the public sector 
Maturity structure (short-term foreign debt) 
Origin (creditors) of foreign debt and interest 
rates 
Projection of repayment of principal and interest 
Various forms of foreign aid 
 
C. CURRENT ACCOUNT 
Real exchange rate 
Current account balance 
Trade balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Terms of Trade 
 
D. INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES 
Real GDP growth in trading partners 
Foreign interest rates 
Price level 
 
E. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
Credit policy 
Changes in the money multiplier 
Real domestic interest rats 
Difference between lending and deposit interest 
rates 
 
F. FISCAL VARIABLES 
Budget deficit 
Government expenditure 
Credits to the public sector 
 
 
G. OTHER FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
Central bank credits to commercial banks 
Gap between demand and supply of money 
Growth of money supply 
Rate of return on bonds 
Rate of inflation 
“Shadow” exchange rate  
Average exchange rate 
M2/international reserves 
 
H. REAL SECTOR 
Real GDP growth 
Employment/unemployment 
Growth of wages 
Price of inventories 
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL 
VARIABLES 
Openness 
Market concentration 
Degree of control of exchange rate 
Duration of fixed exchange rate system 
Degree of financial liberalization 
Size and health of the banking system 
Intensity of previous crises and currency 
disturbances 
Changes on the foreign exchange market 
(devaluation, revaluation, changes in exchange 
rate system, unsuccessful speculative attacks…) 
 
J. POLITICAL VARIABLES 
Elections 
Elections defeats or victories 
Changes in government 
Changes in minister of finance 
Representation of left-wing parties in 
government 
Degree of political (in)stability 
 
Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 1997) 
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Appendix 2 
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF INDICATORS—the “signals” approach 
 
INDICATOR % of 
crises* 
%good 
signals 
%false 
signals 
noise-to-signal ratio lead-time persistence 
of signal* 
  A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)/A/(A+C)]   
Real exchange rate 
Exports 
Share prices 
M2/international reserves 
Index of production 
Monetary equilibrium 
International reserves 
Money multiplier (M2) 
Credit/GDP 
Real interest rates 
Terms of trade 
Real interest differential 
Imports 
Deposits 
Lending/deposit interest rates 
57 
85 
64 
80 
77 
61 
75 
73 
56 
89 
79 
86 
54 
49 
67 
25 
17 
17 
21 
16 
16 
22 
20 
14 
15 
19 
11 
9 
16 
13 
5 
7 
8 
10 
8 
8 
12 
12 
9 
11 
15 
11 
11 
19 
22 
0.19 
0.42 
0.47 
0.48 
0.52 
0.52 
0.55 
0.61 
0.62 
0.77 
0.77 
0.99 
1.16 
1.20 
1.69 
17 
15 
14 
13 
16 
15 
15 
16 
12 
17 
15 
14 
16 
15 
13 
5.14 
2.37 
2.15 
2.07 
1.93 
1.92 
1.82 
1.64 
1.62 
1.30 
1.29 
1.01 
0.86 
0.84 
0.59 
 Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). 
* Percentage of crisis predicted by at least one signal in the 24 months preceding the crisis. 
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